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PREFACE: RENAISSANCE OF THE SUPPLY-ORIENTED ECONOMIC 
POLICY THROUGH THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS 
This is already the 17th publication “Disputes on Estonian Economic Policy” 
(although published only the third year under this name). The papers have been 
published on CD-ROM and their summaries in another language in the collection 
printed on paper media.
1 All papers have been anonymously peer-reviewed by 
economists from mostly other countries. “Disputes on Estonian Economic Policy“ 
are independent collections of research papers which have been published since 
2001 in cooperation by the Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag publishing house (the 
former Berlin-Verlag Arno Spitz) in Berlin and the Estonian Mattimar publishing 
and consultation company.  
The aim of the publications is to analyse and evaluate as much as possible the 
economic developments both in the Republic of Estonia and in the whole European 
Union. It has become particularly topical this year, considering the crises which have 
hit the global economy.  
Estonia joined
2 the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) on 28 June 2004 and has 
consequently taken the commitment according to the EC Treaty to adopt the euro 
after meeting the convergence criteria. When joining the ERM II, Estonia was 
allowed to retain the currency board framework it had followed until that time. The 
Estonian kroon is exchangeable on the basis of the so-called central exchange rate 
fixed by the European Central Bank. 
Estonia has unfortunately not fulfilled the inflation criterion
3 in the recent years. 
While movement towards a greater stability of the price level could be observed 
until 2003, the inflation has considerably increased above all in the course of the last 
three years, namely from 4.4% (2006) to 6.6% (2007) and further to 10.4% (2008), 
and has therefore moved farther away again from the reference value of the 
European economic and monetary union (which was 3.2% in 2008).
4This dynamics 
becomes even more evident if we compare the growth rates in two consecutive 
years: at the beginning of 2007 (ca +5%) and in March 2008 (+11.2%). Such a 
pressure on inflation is caused above all by the increase in the prices of food 
products and energy and also from the dramatic increase in regulated prices. Also 
harmonisation of excise taxes made a contribution to the price increase by almost 
one percentage point. Development of inflation should be viewed in the context of 
the very powerful growth of the real GDP, which was 9% on an average in 2000-
                                                                
1  The summary is either in Estonian, German or English according to the choice of the author. 
The collection has been published in this form (on CD-ROM and on paper) since 2007. 
2  Together with Lithuania. 
3  The inflation rate – according to the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) it must not 
exceed by more than 1.5% the average inflation of three countries with the most stable prices.   
4  Concerning these statistics and those provided below, see: Europäische Zentralbank, 
Konvergenzbericht [Covergence Report of the European Central Bank], May 2008, pp. 31 ff.; 
The due date for the submission of statistical materials for the Convergence Report was 18 
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2007. The increasingly strained situation in the labour market has considerably 
increased unit labour costs: by 8.1% in 2006 and by 18.9% in 2007, which gave 
additional impulses to the inflation due to increased demand but particularly due to 
increased costs.  
On the other hand, the financial situation of the public sector has been good. The 
balance of the state budget has been positive in the previous years but has shown a 
decreasing trend since 2007, namely with respect to GDP: from 3.4% in 2006 to 
2.8% in 2007. For 2008 the European Commission forecast a further decrease in the 
surplus, to 0.4% of the GDP. The debt level decreased respectively from 4.2% in 
2006 to 3.4% in 2007 and therefore remained still considerably below the 60% 
reference value.
5
Market interest rate
6 is another important monetary policy criterion next to the 
inflation rate for joining the euro area. As the government debt level of the country 
is low, no market based on government debt in kroons has developed in Estonia. 
Therefore there are also no long-term harmonised interest rates and it was possible 
to state, considering the market interest rate criterion: „there are at present no 
indications which are sufficiently strong to warrant a negative assessment overall.“
7
The situation of the Estonian economy has also acquired dramatic features in 
connection with the global financial crisis and the economic crisis which has 
developed as a result. In addition to the deepening slowdown of the GDP growth 
which became evident already at the beginning of 2008, now also the sins of the 
financial sector are coming to light. Banks make efforts to limit their losses and have 
offered extremely tough borrowing conditions for some time already. Particularly 
Swedish banks, such as SEB and Swedbank, which are dominating the market and 
issued loans too easily during the boom period which has ended by now. The 
situation of SEB, which has signed loan transactions in the three Baltic countries in 
total for the value of 18.1 billion euros, has become particularly problematic. 
Meanwhile, their central office in Stockholm has considerably limited its lending 
activities. Besides, a special committee has been set up for the timely protection of 
companies from insolvency in the Baltic states.  
Victims of SMS loans are a vivid example of too easy availability of loans in the 
earlier years. A large number of Estonians have been snared by extremely suspicious 
entrepreneurs who have no experience in finances and have acquired through mobile 
phones loans which arrive in just a few minutes. Such borrowers have agreed to 
usurious interest rates to be able to meet in some way their payment obligations 
arising from ordinary mortgage loans from traditional banks. When the debtors then 
                                                                
5  Also these figures have been provided with respect to GDP. 
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issued (time remaining to maturity, if appropriate). Such market interest rate is considered to be 
a criterion on price stability and consequently a criterion for joining the euro, indicating how 
markets evaluate the will of the candidate countries to maintain their stability. 
7  Europäische Zentralbank, Konvergenzbericht Mai 2008, pp. 37. 17
delay with the repayments of their SMS loan, debt collection companies, which are 
often subsidiaries of SMS loan providers, appear and collect the debts without any 
mercy.  
Many construction companies have had to stop their uncompleted construction 
projects as the possible buyers had no opportunity for further financing (usually due 
to the inability to repay bank loans). Real estate prices have already dramatically 
decreased. Lending banks have to write off loans in their balance sheets and show 
losses.  
Similar to other East European countries, Estonia is in a plight as it had a high 
export-import balance deficit (11.2% of GDP), low foreign currency reserves (ratio 
of gross reserves to short-term foreign loans only 0.2%), high foreign loans (net 
position with foreign banks 78.7% GDP) and its economic growth had largely been 
financed with loans (credits to the private sector +21.5%).
8
Estonia also has to thoroughly reform its financial sector for its integration with the 
EU and before joining the currency union. Considering the above-mentioned 
circumstances, the following requirements should be met or at least thoroughly 
considered:
 Financing activities of the national economies of different countries have 
merged into a global structure, therefore countries have to harmonise the regulation 
of their financial markets and performance of supervision over these markets. It 
should be done in close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to create a global advance warning system 
which would consist of supervisory organisations of different countries, whose duty 
is to ensure continuous monitoring the activities of the most important banks in their 
area and to prepare regular risk analyses. This applies first and foremost to single-
purpose companies which were established at many places some time ago to 
perform risky investment transactions off balance sheet. 
 More transparency should be brought to financial markets. In the securitisation 
of loans, the exact risk structures should be clearly identified. Besides, crediting 
banks should be required to partly assume the risk of losses, comparable to risk for 
own account in insurance. 
 Rating agencies should be subjected to more strict assessment guidelines and the 
registration obligation. Also hedge funds should be inspected more regularly in the 
future.
 The Basel II regulations based on formulas for establishing requirements to the 
equity of banks should be made more flexible to prevent procyclic behaviour in 
issuing loans, which may become particularly problematic in the decline phase of 
the economic cycle as demonstrated by the current situation. 
 In that respect the fair value assessment rules of financial investments should be 
critically reviewed (if these are applicable). This need emerges particularly in the 
context of the most recent financial crisis. And bearing in mind the future, we could 
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also discuss the possibility for suspending even temporarily the disbursements of 
dividends earned from gains from exchange rates. 
 And last but not least – the compensation and bonus systems of bank managers 
and other heads of companies should be modified to make their income dependent 
on meeting long-term objectives rather than on short-term success. 
The current generally recognised macroeconomic theories and the resulting 
conceptions of economic policy are often based on assumptions which are far from 
reality – that markets are permanently efficient and that individuals always proceed 
from rational considerations. Non-economic motives and irrational behavioural 
patterns are probably not taken into consideration at all in the currently recognised 
models. This has led to the situation where the most valid reasons for recurrent 
crises are mostly ignored. George Akerlof and Robert Shiller rely on John Maynard 
Keynes in using the concept of „animal spirits“
9, which in their opinion has more 
effect on economic developments than rational economic factors. „Waves of 
optimism and pessimism cause considerable changes in general economic demand“. 
All economic crises are originally driven by psychological factors. What conclusion 
can be drawn from it? The state has to assume a proactive role in economy and take 
timely measures against convulsions of the market caused by „animal spirits“. In 
order to maintain the stability of capitalism, the market should not in principle be 
left to its own devices. John Maynard Keynes is dead; long live John Maynard 
Keynes! 
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